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1. Introduction 
 As a result of recent concerns relating to the harmful effects of global warming, 
policy makers have become increasingly interested in the use of environmental 
taxation as a means of combating the problem. This research aims to address this 
issue, by determining whether environmental taxes have had any significant effect on 
the levels of air pollution and the complimentary phenomenon of energy consumption 
within the European Union (EU). Over the recent past, the EU members have been set 
voluntary targets for the reduction in pollution and consumption of hydro-carbon 
fuels, which have facilitated the sometimes controversial use of environmental taxes 
across the EU, including the countries that have recently joined. 
 
  To date the empirical literature on this issue has mainly concentrated on the use of 
simulation exercises rather than the use econometric modelling, due to the lack of 
suitable macro-data. This paper attempts to contribute to the debate on the 
effectiveness of environmental taxes, by using an EU panel data set to determine if 
there is any link between environmental taxes and air pollution and therefore whether 
the EU environmental policy to date has been successful. 
 
The main empirical work on environmental taxation has centred on the use of 
simulations on the impact of environmental tax reform (ETR) on the environment, use 
of natural resources and the wider economy. Most of the studies conclude that 
increased environmental tax and ETR can have beneficial effects on the environment. 
(see Bosquet (2000)). In addition there has recently been a substantial level of 
research into determinants of pollution and energy usage. Grossman and Krueger 
(1995) provided evidence for a non-linear relationship between per capita income and 
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pollution, termed the ‘Environmental Kuznets Curve’, with an inverted U-shaped 
relationship. However other studies such as Stern and Common (2001) suggest the 
relationship could be monotonic, whilst Deacon and Norman (2006) find the 
relationship tends to be country specific and dependent on the approach used. 
However as yet there is little evidence of fiscal factors being considered in this area of 
the empirical literature at the macroeconomic level
1
. 
 
 Following the introduction, the methodology used in this study is outlined and the 
form that ETR has taken in the EU member states discussed. The data and results are 
then examined and finally we suggest some conclusions and policy implications. 
 
2. Methodology 
The model of the determinants of both pollution and energy consumption used in this 
study are partially based on the conventional approach to pollution suggested by 
Grossman and Krueger (1995), although as Harbaugh et al. (2002) suggest there is 
little theoretical material to determine the correct specification. However based on 
other studies, the explanatory variables include the common per capita GDP measures 
in linear and non-linear form. In addition per capita capital formation is also included 
in the model, to proxy the ratio between capital and labour supply, as measures of 
capital and investment have proven to be important determinants in other models, as 
is also the case with population. The final determinant is the environmental tax 
imposed in each country included in this study. This produces the following 
relationship, including the squared GDP term and a lagged dependent variable to 
account for inertia in adjustment to desired or targeted pollution levels: 
                                                 
1
 In a micro-based approach Brannlund et al. (2007) assess the use of energy based taxes on energy 
consumption. 
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ititititititit upoptaxpckpcypollpoll   5432110         (1) 
 
Where pollit is a pollution index (total greenhouse gas emissions) in the first model 
and energy consumption (tonnes of oil equivalent) in the second complimentary 
model. pcyit is per capita real GDP, 
2
itpcy is per capita real GDP squared, pckit is the 
per capita capital formation and taxit is environmental taxes expressed as a proportion 
of both GDP and total tax revenue, popit is population (All variables in logarithms, 
except taxes which are expressed as a percentage).  
 
 It is often assumed in the empirical literature that per capita income will have a non-
linear relationship with pollution, as originally observed by Grossman and Krueger 
(1995), so a squared per capita GDP measure is also included in the model. They 
incorporated this variable to account for the inverted U-shaped relationship. The 
approach adopted here follows other studies, such as Stern and Common (2001) in 
including both a linear and non-linear squared form of per capita GDP, which should 
be positively and negatively signed respectively. The per capita capital variable 
should have a negative relationship, as increasing investment should facilitate the 
move to more advanced energy efficient production techniques. The environmental 
taxes should have a negative effect, assuming exemptions have not significantly 
reduced their effectiveness, as either they encourage more efficient use of resources or 
a reduction in energy consumption. 
 
 In this study the environmental tax revenue as a proportion of GDP and total tax 
revenue is used as a proxy for the tax rate. The measure of environmental tax revenue 
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is based on the internationally recognised definition used by the Statistical Office of 
the European Union (Eurostat). An environmental tax is defined as any tax, which has 
a physical unit as a base and for which there is evidence that it has a specific effect on 
the environment  
 
 Although it is assumed the effect of environmental taxes on pollution and energy 
consumption should be negative, it may not be significant due to exemptions to 
energy-intensive industries. A number of studies have suggested that to maintain 
‘international competitiveness’, the effectiveness of these taxes has been reduced 
through offering exemptions to these industries. Ekins and Speck (1999) note that this 
is a feature of member states in the EU and has important implications for the 
effectiveness of these taxes and welfare costs for the economies concerned.  
  
3. Data and Results 
 The data is all annual and runs from 1995 (the earliest available) to 2006 and includes 
all the economies that are currently members of the EU
2
 and for which there is data, 
including those that joined the EU recently, such as the transition economies (The list 
of countries is included in Table 1). Although the data covers the era, when some 
countries were not direct members of the EU, they were preparing to join and trying 
                                                 
2
 The EU data is used due to the recent availability of its environmental tax data and the extensive 
literature on the implementation of environmental tax policy in the EU. In addition the definitions of 
both tax revenue and the pollution index are roughly common across the EU countries in the sample, 
ensuring the data shares the same features across the variables in the panel. However the data only 
starts in 1995 for many of the countries in the sample, limiting the dataset to just 300 observations. The 
data was taken from the Economic and Social Data Services (ESDS) website, which contains the 
Eurostat database. 
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to conform to the more environmentally friendly policies that the EU encouraged over 
the sample period. 
 
 The data is taken from the Statistics Office of the European Communities (Eurostat) 
and includes real GDP, capital formation, the total population and the environmental 
tax revenue relative to both GDP and total tax revenue data. The data on pollution is 
an index defined as the total greenhouse gas emissions (CO2 equivalent). The 
consumption of energy is defined as ‘gross inland consumption’ in terms of thousands 
of tonnes of oil equivalent. Table 1 provides the summary tax statistics for each 
country, the tax revenue statistics suggest that most countries collect about 3% of 
GDP in environmental taxes, with the Scandinavian countries having the highest 
mean, whilst the transition countries have the lowest.  
 
 Tables 2 and 3 include the results from the Arellano-Bover (1995) two step dynamic 
panel approach, using lags of the transformed and non-transformed variables in the 
model as instruments, with Sargan’s test accepting the null that the overidentifying 
restrictions are valid in all cases. In the second stage of estimation any 
heteroskedasticity is accounted for using  robust White period standard errors. 
 
 Table 2 contains the results using the measure of pollution as the dependent variable, 
as well as the two different measures of environmental taxes, the models are estimated 
with both linear and non-linear GDP measures. In all the results, regardless of 
specification or definition of the tax variable, environmental taxes have a negative and 
significant effect on pollution, suggesting as environmental taxes have risen, so air 
pollution within the EU has, as expected fallen. The sensitivity of the relationship 
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between environmental taxes and the dependent variables depends on the definition of 
the tax variable, being roughly double for the tax relative to GDP measure. Where a 
1% rise in tax relative to GDP produces approximately a 1% decline in pollution. 
However the tax relative to total taxes is the more significant, which supports the 
Goulder (1996) finding that when considering environmental taxes, the relationship 
with other taxes needs to be included. 
 
 There is little evidence that per capita GDP in both the linear and non-linear form 
have had the expected non-linear effect on pollution, which supports Harbaugh et al. 
(2002),who find that the inverted U-shaped relationship between GDP and pollution 
as suggested by the Kuznets curve approach does not hold between all countries and 
all model specifications. It could also be due to the role of the EU, as suggested by 
Deacon and Norman (2006) who suggest EU laws and directives during the 1980s and 
1990s have required a single policy response across all member states to reducing 
pollution, irrespective of levels of an individual nation’s income. Table 3. Has energy 
consumption as the dependent variable and the results suggest that environmental 
taxes have had little significant effect on energy consumption. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 This study suggests that the recent introduction of environmental taxes in the EU has 
had a significantly negative effect on pollution, but limited effect on the use of energy 
resources. This suggests that the myriad exemptions for energy-intensive sectors of 
the economy have had only a limited effect on the efficacy of this policy. These 
results also provide support for those studies suggesting that the consequences of 
environmental taxes are dependent on the structure of other tax levels, as measuring 
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environmental taxes relative to total taxes has the most significant effect. However 
there is mixed evidence on levels of income having any effect on pollution and energy 
consumption, as also found in other studies.  The policy implications of these results 
are that the current use of environmental taxes to reduce the EU’s present levels of 
pollution appear to be having some effect, although the relationship with other taxes 
needs to be considered. The lack of a significant effect on energy consumption, 
suggests environmental taxes are not reducing consumption, implying pollution is 
being reduced through the use of cleaner technologies. 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics regarding tax revenue (%) 
 % of GDP % of total tax 
Country mean variance mean variance 
Austria 
Belgium 
Czech Republic 
Cyprus 
Denmark 
Estonia 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Hungary 
Ireland 
Italy 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Luxembourg 
Malta 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Poland 
Portugal 
Slovakia 
Spain 
Sweden 
United Kingdom 
2.44 
2.34 
2.57 
3.02 
5.23 
1.77 
3.13 
2.56 
2.38 
2.53 
2.99 
2.69 
3.16 
2.29 
1.80 
2.87 
3.48 
3.82 
2.44 
2.21 
3.19 
1.94 
2.12 
2.85 
2.83 
0.05 
0.01 
0.02 
0.26 
0.17 
0.20 
0.02 
0.04 
0.03 
0.19 
0.06 
0.10 
0.09 
0.22 
0.12 
0.01 
0.10 
0.02 
0.53 
0.12 
0.06 
0.70 
0.02 
0.01 
0.06 
5.66 
5.20 
7.30 
9.92 
10.66 
5.50 
6.93 
5.85 
5.93 
8.01 
7.72 
8.61 
7.59 
7.59 
6.12 
7.51 
11.94 
9.79 
5.70 
6.55 
9.41 
6.66 
6.22 
5.72 
7.82 
0.25 
0.06 
0.07 
1.02 
0.64 
2.72 
0.12 
0.20 
0.27 
2.69 
0.30 
0.52 
0.50 
2.74 
1.38 
0.14 
3.55 
0.17 
2.76 
1.68 
0.97 
1.55 
0.31 
0.05 
0.51 
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Table 2 Dynamic panel models of pollution  
 1 2 3 4 
Poll(-1) 
 
Pcy 
 
Pcy
2 
 
pcK 
 
pop 
 
Taxy 
 
Taxt 
 
J-statistic 
OIR(Sargan) 
Observations 
0.686* 
(56.227) 
-0.002 
(0.077) 
 
 
0.027 
(1.121) 
0.378* 
(4.770) 
-1.074* 
(3.089) 
 
 
21.410 
0.315 
300 
0.654* 
(29.400) 
-0.319* 
(1.996) 
-0.031* 
(2.061) 
0.016 
(0.710) 
0.655* 
(4.627) 
-1.411* 
(4.169) 
 
 
21.815 
0.294 
300 
0.664* 
(52.722) 
0.009 
(0.340) 
 
 
0.024 
(0.949) 
0.332* 
(3.582) 
 
 
-0.538* 
(4.541) 
21.577 
0.306 
300 
0.632* 
(31.941) 
-0.311* 
(2.253) 
-0.031* 
(2.443) 
-0.013 
(0.520) 
0.630* 
(4.767) 
 
 
-0.600* 
(4.834) 
22.008 
0.284 
300 
Notes: Variables are as in Equation (4), a * (**) indicates significance at the 
5%(10%) levl. OIR is the Sargan test for overidentifying restrictions, with the p-value 
included. All models estimated using GMM and orthogonal deviations, with White 
period instrument weighting matrix and standard errors and covariance matrix. The 
instruments include the second lag of the dependent variable and first lags of the 
explanatory variables in both the transformed and untransformed form. 
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Table 3 Dynamic panel models of energy consumption 
 1 2 3 4 
En (-1) 
 
Pcy 
 
Pcy
2 
 
pcK 
 
population 
 
Taxy 
 
Taxt 
 
J-statistic 
OIR(Sargan) 
Observations 
0.455* 
(26.540) 
0.001 
(0.014) 
 
 
0.028 
(0.454) 
1.056* 
(6.076) 
0.0104 
(0.604) 
 
 
18.410 
0.495 
300 
0.434* 
(20.784) 
0.191 
(0.331) 
0.016 
(0.306) 
0.012 
(0.184) 
0.950** 
(1.809) 
0.097 
(0.037) 
 
 
18.415 
0.495 
300 
0.427* 
(21.490) 
-0.014 
(0.195) 
 
 
0.038 
(0.705) 
1.164* 
(6.707) 
 
 
0.363 
(0.748) 
18.931 
0.461 
300 
 
 
0.446* 
(16.187) 
0.143 
(0.226) 
0.013 
(0.225) 
0.028 
(0.521) 
0.994* 
(2.010) 
 
 
0.268 
(0.350) 
18.879 
0.465 
300 
 
 
Notes: See Table 2. 
 
 
